Zoonoses -diseases transmitted from animals to humans -have arguably shaped human history like nothing else. When hunters and gatherers first settled down and domesticated animals, they created the fundamental problem that we are still fighting today. Living closely with animals, they heightened the risk of transmission of infectious agents, and by living in ever larger communities, they provided host populations large enough for diseases to establish themselves indefinitely (Curr. Biol. (2013) 23, R667-R670).
Today's childhood diseases, such as measles and chickenpox, originated this way. Typically, these zoonoses were much deadlier in the beginning, but over the course of millennia they adapted to an ecological equilibrium that spares lives but makes transmission more likely. Lacking the relative immunity that the farmers developed, hunter-gatherer societies succumbed to the germs of the invading armies of farming nations as often as to their weapons, as Jared Diamond has explained in his widely known book Guns, Germs and Steel. Considering that our civilisation created this problem and carried it around the globe, we are remarkably ill prepared to deal with new instances of disease transmission from animals to people. Against bacterial disease we have for the past half-century enjoyed the protection of antibiotics, which we are now at risk of losing -again, largely a problem our society has brought upon itself (Curr. Biol. (2013) 
The situation is much worse for viruses. Established viral diseases can often be prevented by immunisations, but if an animal virus newly acquires the ability to spread within the human population, as HIV and Ebola have done in the 20 th century, and as some of the more than 100 variants of avian influenza might do at any time, we are unprepared.
Wondwossen Gebreyes from Ohio State University in Columbus, USA, and colleagues have argued in a recent paper that zoonoses and vector-borne diseases should be addressed globally with a 'One Health' approach. This essentially means that all aspects of human, animal, and ecosystem health should be taken into account, which requires interdisciplinary as well as international cooperation (PLoS Negl. Trop. Dis. (2014) 8, e3257) .
The authors argue that the current Ebola crisis in West Africa should be seen as "an extreme stark reminder" of the importance of zoonotic diseases and the need for a global One Health approach. While every disease has its specific problems, as will be discussed in examples below, the recent International Congress on Pathogens at the Human-Animal Interface (ICOPHAI, Porto de Galinhas, Brazil, 2013) has identified a number of general capacitybuilding needs, including sciencebased risk management policies, skilled personnel, and provision of public Features health diagnostic laboratories with shared access to databases.
These needs are particularly pressing in the impoverished tropical countries that typically carry the largest burden of infectious disease already and have poor health provision, as demonstrated by the current outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa.
Lessons from Ebola
The current Ebola outbreak in West Africa was first noticed in Guinea in March 2014 and soon became the worst epidemic of this disease. Ebola was first identified in 1976, when two separate outbreaks occurredone in Nzara, Sudan, and one in Yambuku, Democratic Republic of the Congo (then known as Zaire), near the Ebola River, from which the name was derived. With 318 registered cases and 280 deaths, the Yambuku outbreak remained the largest one until the end of May 2014, when the outbreak in West Africa spiralled out of control.
By November 25 th , over 15,300 cases and more than 5,400 deaths were recorded in West Africa. Liberia was worst affected, closely followed by Sierra Leone and Guinea, where the outbreak originated. At the time of At the end of the year that saw Ebola virus disease dominate the news, experts warn that other zoonoses also pose serious threats. To prepare for disease outbreaks and avoid global epidemics, health services and researchers may have to adopt a broader perspective, known as the 'One Health' paradigm, which links the health of people, domestic and wild animals, and the ecosystems they inhabit. Michael Gross reports.
Our shared burden of diseases
Protective gear: The precautions necessary to prevent the spread of Ebola look spectacular, but if the disease had received more attention on its first occurrence in the 1970s, it might be less of a problem today. (Photo: Used with permission from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) www.cdc.gov.)
writing, the number of new cases per time appears to be stabilising, such that the cumulative numbers only increase linearly, rather than exponentially.
Conducting the first epidemiological analyses of the crisis, the group of Alison Galvani and colleagues have found that several known factors all contribute to the dangerous spread of the disease, and must all be addressed efficiently if the outbreak is to be overcome (Science (2014) 346, 991-995). In line with earlier studies of smaller outbreaks, the researchers report that hygienic burial practices are of vital importance. Traditions involving kissing, touching and washing the deceased have been blamed for a large number of transmissions. In addition, however, the epidemiologists find that effective isolation of patients in hospital settings, as well as tracing and surveillance of their contacts are also strict requirements for a successful suppression of disease spread.
Ebola virus disease is not normally present in the human population. Each outbreak goes back to a transmission from a wild animal host. In the case of the current outbreak, fruit bats in the rainforest of Guinea are the most likely source.
Thus, the disease illustrates the whole range of concerns combined in the One Health paradigm. The ecological context enabling the transmission of the infection between animals and humans, the medical problems, including the lack of efficient treatments and vaccines, and the sociocultural factors, such as the traditional burial procedures, all have to be addressed in context.
Crucially, such measures can only be implemented if the affected population trusts the health workers. Investigations reported by Timothy Roberton from Johns Hopkins University at the annual meeting of the American Public Health Associations at New Orleans in November suggest that a lack of trust had led people to ignore health advice and thus contributed to the rapid spread of the disease in the early stages of the outbreak.
"This is a nation where many people are hesitant to seek health care at the best of times. Suddenly people are being told not to touch their sick children and to come to health facilities as soon as they have a fever," Roberton said. "We assume as health professionals that everyone is just going to follow our advice, that we can fight these things with our intelligence and resources. But it's not irrational that they chose to ignore the advice. Unless we appreciate how difficult it is for families to follow the guidance we give them, our Ebola control plans look wonderful on paper, but they're going to fail."
Research on new treatments and vaccines is now being pushed forward with great urgency, but considering that the danger of Ebola has been known since the 1970s, one may wonder why it has remained a neglected disease for so long.
Avian influenza fears
Like Ebola virus disease, avian influenza or bird flu is a zoonotic disease caused by an RNA virus, meaning that it has the potential to adapt to human hosts. The flu virus also has the ability to swap genome fragments between strains when one host carries more than one strain of the virus.
Influenza viruses are endemic in wild water fowl, where they appear to cause no disease, and they may spill over to domestic birds. Transmission of bird flu viruses from domestic poultry to humans occurs fairly regularly in parts of Asia where people live in crowded conditions together with their poultry. The well-publicised scenario that experts most fear is that one day a strain making the leap into the human population may carry both the ability to spread easily, e.g. through the airways, and a severe manifestation of the infection with high mortality, comparable to the 'Spanish Flu' of 1918, which caused millions of deaths.
Avian flu viruses are identified by the combination of two antigens, one out of 16 types of haemagglutinin, and one of nine versions of neuraminidase, resulting in up to 144 possible combinations, which are encoded in the now familiar code of two letters and two numbers, such as H5N1 for the strain considered most dangerous. In November 2014, three outbreaks of flu in domestic poultry were identified in Europe, including one in Germany, one in the Netherlands, and one in England. All three involve a flu virus of the type H5N8, which official statements described as of "low risk to human health". Still, precautionary measures included the culling of thousands of birds at the sites affected.
In a review written for a special issue on the One Health approach, Dirk Pfeiffer from the Royal Veterinary College at Hatfield, UK, and his colleagues analysed the situation of H5N1 in the Greater Mekong subregion, an area comprising Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. The authors reported that H5N1 is now firmly established in that area as well as in parts of China and Egypt (Comp. The authors concluded: "Standard disease response prescriptions that populate international guidelines and are replicated in country plans assume well-functioning human and animal health systems, rapid and efficient response capacity, and upto-date epidemiological information and technical expertise, none of which prevail in most GMS countries."
They warn that, for small-scale poultry keepers, avian flu isn't one of their major everyday concerns, so they are unlikely to cooperate with measures when they don't understand their point. Risk management, the authors suggest, should take the economic and health worries of the people at the front line into account and link the more abstract threat of mutated flu viruses to those.
Eradication of the firmly entrenched flu strains appears to be an unrealistic goal at the moment, but, by targeting transmission routes and risky behaviours, authorities could reduce the danger of frequent transmissions to humans.
Tuberculosis comeback
Transmission of tuberculosis between species has been a hotly debated issue in the UK in recent years, as debates over bovine TB and badger culls continue (Curr. Biol. (2013) 23, R545-R548). Human tuberculosis has also returned as a global health problem due to the emergence of drug-resistant strains of Mycobacterium and the lack of new antibiotics.
Tuberculosis illustrates the connectedness of the health of humans, domestic animals and wild animals, as the infection can jump between any of these groups, as reported by Michele Miller from Palm Beach Zoo, Florida, and Francisco Olea-Popelka from Colorado State University at Fort Collins, USA (Comp. Immunol. Microbiol. Infect. Dis. (2013) 36, 263-268) .
Some of the more exotic examples include suspected transmission from humans to Chacma baboons in South Africa, to Asian elephants in Nepal, Thailand, and India, and vice versa in the USA; from cattle to panthers and minks in Argentina, and to jaguars in Venezuela; and from cattle to buffalos to lions in South Africa. Zoo staff are at risk of catching the infection (which doesn't necessarily lead to disease) from aerosols produced by cleaning procedures, for instance.
Miller and Olea-Popelka concluded that the interfaces between humans, domestic animals and wildlife need to be closely watched for such zoonotic transmissions. Disease outbreaks in sentinel populations, such as the baboons in South Africa, they argued, could reflect important changes in the ecology and environment that could change the spread of disease and ultimately endanger human populations.
Other zoonoses
Further insights can be gained from case studies of rabies, which is endemic in some parts of the world, but absent in others. From its wildlife reservoirs, this disease poses a threat to dogs and humans alike and is much feared, as its outcome is often fatal. Sunny Townsend from the University of Glasgow, UK, reviewed the success of surveillance for rabies in various parts of the world and set up One Health style guidance for the road towards regional elimination of the disease (Comp. Immunol. Microbiol. Infect. Dis. (2013) 36, 249-261) .
The strategy to adopt depends crucially on the quality of surveillance available, the authors find. Where surveillance is poor and only spots one case in ten, mass immunisation of dogs may be the best answer. High quality of surveillance is difficult to achieve in many developing countries, where rabies remains a threat.
Ohio State's Gebreyes, for instance, is involved with efforts to fight rabies in Ethiopia, developing a roadmap for the prevention and control of rabies as a model for the One Health platform. "Rabies is the year-round Ebola of Ethiopia, as it regularly kills peopleparticularly the young. It is 100 percent fatal if interventions such as vaccines and awareness are not implemented," Gebreyes said. "We consider this partnership a model for how to build effective, sustainable capacity."
Many other zoonoses still exist, and the most worrying aspect of the problem is that new ones can emerge at any time without even being noticed at first. A better understanding of the ecological triangle between people, domesticated animals and wild animals would help to spot dangers earlier. And, if Ebola has taught us anything, maybe the next disease that crosses over into the human population should be targeted immediately, and not 38 years later.
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